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Extensive discussions about the nature and value 
of personhood, of metaphysical and normative aspects of 
becoming a person and ceasing to be one, having been 
conducted at the very center of the debates on abortion, 
therapeutic human cloning, embryo experimentation, and 
so on, for decades have proven notoriously difficult and 
their insights disappointingly inconclusive. In the paper I 
would like to turn our attention to the other end of the life 
span and explore the moral implications of acknowledging 
to, or witholding from, someone the status of a person, i.e. 
a rational being, for the choice between prolonging her life 
and facilitating her death. 
The philosophical challenge facing the opponent of 
euthanasia can then be put as follows: suppose the 
patient's decision to have her life terminated is both 
voluntary and prudent; further suppose that neither her 
decision nor the carrying out of it by a health professional 
violates anyone's rights or fails to discharge anyone's 
duties. What else could possibly make the doctor's 
compliance with the patient's request wrong and what 
other moral objections could possibly be raised against the 
proposal to provide a legal protection for such an option for 
the terminally-ill patients? 
 
2. The "missed encounter" argument 
In a series of recent papers David Velleman has 
tried to provide a solution to the above mentioned riddle. 
The following quotation introduces his ingenious idea, one 
which I will be primarily concerned with in this paper. 
"I believe that respect for a person's dignity, 
properly conceived, can require us to facilitate her death 
when that dignity is being irremediably compromised. I 
also believe, however, that a person's dignity can be so 
compromised only by circumstances that are likely to 
compromise her capacity for fully rational and autonomous 
decisionmaking. ... One reason for my opposition (to the 
idea of a legal right to die) is the belief that so long as 
patients would be fully competent to exercise an option of 
being euthanized, their doing so would be immoral, in the 
majority of cases, because their dignity as persons would 
still be intact" (Velleman 1992a, 667) 
We can reconstruct Velleman's argument against 
the permissibility (and legalization) of active euthanasia as 
follows: 
(1) We ought to respect the dignity of every person 
(be it in ourselves or in others). 
(2) In circumstances where a person's dignity has 
been irremediably compromised (circumstances of 
compromised dignity or CCD) and only in those 
circumstances, the principle of respect for a person's 
dignity can command us to facilitate her death. 
(3) CCDs are identical with, or at least non-
contingently coincide with, circumstances in which a 
person's capacity for fully rational and autonomous 
decision making is compromised (circumstances of 
compromised autonomy or CCA). 
(3*) One cannot be in CCD, unless one is in CCA. 
(4) No violation of the principle of respect for the 
dignity of persons can ever be morally justified.  
(5) Only CCDs are CPEs (circumstances of 
permissible euthanasia). 
Therefore (from 3 and 5) 
(6) In CPEs patients will never be fully competent 
to exercise an option of being euthanized, i.e. as long as 
they are in CPE, they are not in CFC (circumstances of full 
competence), and vice versa. 
(7) If the circumstances in which the terminally ill 
patients can fully competently exercise the option of being 
euthanized, and those in which it is permissible or even 
obligatory to provide them with such option, can in 
principle never coincide, then it makes no sense to protect 
such an option by means of a law. 
Thus 
(8) It makes no sense to provide terminally ill 
patients with a legally protected choice between having 
their life prolonged and being euthanized. 
The upshot of Velleman's opposition to active 
euthanasia is that destroying the life of a person is morally 
wrong, unless its (her) dignity has been irremediably 
compromised; in which case, however, the person can no 
longer make a morally and legally binding decision to die. 
Let's call this the "missed encounter argument" to 
celebrate/emphasize the fact that, according to it, 
circumstances of permissible euthanasia and those of a 
morally legitimate decision to die can in principle never 
coincide. Is Velleman's argument sound? My thesis is that 
it is not. In my rebuttal, I will focus on the crucial premise 
(3). I will contend that this premise cannot stand closer 
scrutiny (as will become apparent when we reflect on 
cases like the one described below), and that we should 
therefore reject both the intermediate conclusion (6) and 
the final conclusion (8).  
Consider the following situation. 
"Diane Pretty, 42, has been left almost completely 
paralysed from the neck down by motor neurone disease. 
Due to her condition, she is too disabled to kill herself and 
the 1961 Suicide Act prevents anyone from helping her. 
She was diagnosed with this untreatable disease in 1999. 
Alone in Britain as many as 5000 people may be affected 
by it. Motor neurone disease is a group of ailments 
affecting nerve cells along which the brain delivers 
messages to muscles. This leads to weakness and 
wasting of muscles, usually first in the arms and legs, but 
progressively in other areas as well. Intellect, touch, smell 
and hearing are not usually affected. At present, Mrs. 
Pretty is still fully mentally competent and uses little power 
she has in her arm to communicate by using a machine on 
her wheelchair which prints out text messages. As her 
disease progresses, however, nerve cells in her brain and 
spinal cord will further degenerate. The muscles in the 
diaphragm essential to breathing will become paralysed, 
leaving her to suffocate. There is no cure for the disease, 
except a drug called riluzole which can slow the advance 
of one form. Two in 10 people are alive five years after 




diagnosis and one in 10 survives more than 10 years." 
(from an account of Diane Pretty's legal battle in The 
Guardian) 
Diane Pretty's unfortunate situation, or so I would 
like to claim, is an example of life (and person) that is 
pretty much devoid of dignity despite the fact that she is 
still perfectly capable of making rational and moral choices. 
As such it demonstrates that not all CCDs (circumstances 
of compromised dignity) are CCAs (circumstances of 
compromised capacity for autonomy), as Velleman 
erroneously maintains. There are CPEs (circumstances of 
permissible euthanasia) - other than those in which the 
patient's rational capacities are literally switched off due to 
"the pain so unbearable that one's whole life is focused on 
that pain" (the only situation of CCD which Velleman 
explicitly admits of as providing justification for the 
destruction of a person('s life), see Velleman 1999, 618) - 
in which the patient's decision to die is perfectly legitimate 
and hence binding on others. Velleman's final conclusion 
is thus simply wrong.  
What Velleman overlooks, in his argument, is that 
the concept of dignity is intimately linked to the concept of 
(rational) agency and that some patients lacking the 
capacity for (not only rational) agency (but agency 
altogether) may nevertheless be fully competent and 
autonomous decisionmakers. This insight, if correct, can 
be used to construct a simple argument against 
Velleman's conclusions along the following lines. 
According to Kant, "morality, and humanity, so far as it is 
capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity" 
(Kant 1785/1981, 40-1). On one plausible construal of this 
thesis, only rational agents are capable of morality, and so 
only (rational) agents can have dignity. Since not all 
human beings are agents (Diane Pretty is not one), not all 
human beings will have dignity and not everyone's 
existence will command unconditional respect.  
Now I can think of the two promising ways in which 
one can question the credibility of the intuition that by 
complying with Diane Pretty's request to help her die one 
would no longer violate the principle of respect for the 
dignity of every person (or that, at least, in her and similar 
cases, an affront to her dignity would, and should, be 
morally justifiable - this latter view would commit us to 
rejecting the premise (4)). One is to deny that Diane 
Pretty's decision to die is really autonomous and/or 
competent and hence morally and legally binding; the 
other is to insist that Diane Pretty has, despite 
appearances to the contrary, preserved her capacity for 
rational and autonomous agency (and, consequently, her 
dignity as a person). Let me take these challenges in turn. 
 
3. Competent and/or autonomous decision-
making 
Is Diane Pretty's decision to die really competent 
and/or autonomous? It certainly seems so to her 
supportive relatives, to various legal representatives and 
judges (none of them has ever tried to dismiss her motion 
by appeal to this alleged defect), but is she really 
competent and autonomous? Consult, as a first 
approximation to a satisfying answer, the list of conditions 
deemed necessary for someone's competence as a 
decision-maker. Such criteria normaly include things such 
as the capacity for understanding and communication, the 
capacity for reasoning and deliberation, and the capacity 
for the formation and application of a consistent and stable 
conception of the good, or set of values. (Buchanan and 
Brock 1990, 23-5) There is no evidence, either in what we 
know generally about different stages of the advancing 
motor neurone disease, or in what we know about her 
particular medical condition, to suggest that Diane Pretty 
has lost, up to the present moment, all, most, or even 
some, of the above capacities, and is hence incapable of 
making a competent (and, consequently, legally binding) 
decision about her life. 
The distinction I would like to uphold, between 
being a rational (moral) decision-maker and being a 
rational (moral) agent, can be drawn within the very 
domain of autonomy. Beauchamp and Childress (1994), 
for example, introduce a useful distinction between the so-
called decisional and executional autonomy. A person is 
autonomous in the former sense if she is capable of 
making personal, informed choices; and she is 
executionaly autonomous insofar as she can implement 
those choices. Each of the two capacities is relatively 
independent - a disease or detrimental effects of ageing 
may (as it often happens) significantly reduce (or even 
completely eradicate) the person's ability to implement her 
personal, informed choices (i.e. impede on her executional 
autonomy), without at the same time affecting her ability to 
make such choices (i.e. deteriorating her decisional 
autonomy). Both aspects of autonomy are, however, or so 
it seems in the light of the previous discussion, a 
necessary component of the supervenience base of 
dignity. 
 
4. Autonomy pertains to decision-making, 
not action? 
One might find my suggestion that dignity does not 
depend just on one's capacity for rational and autonomous 
choice, but must at least partly be grounded in one's 
capacity for rational agency, plainly false, because it 
contradicts Kant's treatment of autonomy as attribute of 
(primarily) human wills, not actions. Given this, are we not 
driven to the conclusion that one has uncompromised 
dignity, as long as one has preserved autonomous will, 
whether one is in principle capable of implementing or 
exercizing it in action or not? Yet such a conclusion is 
certainly premature. Kant himself defines will as "the 
power to act (my emphasis) in accordance with one's 
ideas of laws or principles" (Kant 1785/1981). For him, to 
have will is to have power to make things happen for 
reasons, or according to policies or principles. And his idea 
of autonomy, as a property of the will of rational agents, is 
to be understood in terms of the reasons, or principles, for 
which we act. (see also Hill 1992, 84) It is constitutive of 
ourselves as rational/moral agents that we conceive of 
ourselves as being free - that we deliberate about what to 
do and make choices about our actions on the assumption 
that our choices and actions are up to us, i.e. that they are 
not causally determined by some prior causal conditions 
over which we can exert no control (desires, 
inclinations,…). So autonomy, even if primarily a property 
of the individual's will, is essentially connected with his 
agency, and its attributions only make sense in the context 
of practicing agents. 
  
5. Proving too much? 
One might find my claim simply too strong. If Diane 
Pretty were no longer a rational or moral agent, as I 
contend, would she then not loose her moral standing 
altogether (with the further implication that considerations 
other than what she wants would become relevant or even 
crucial in deciding her faith)? Let me explain. On one 
plausible reading of Kant, (all and) only moral agents 
qualify as moral patients, i.e. beings with moral status 




(Hayward (1994) calls this "the patient-agent parity 
thesis"). But my treatment of Diane Pretty's condition as 
one permitting the termination of her life, my insistence 
that she no longer qualifies as a rational agent and that 
she has, consequently, lost the dignity that attaches to 
every person in virtue of this capacity, then not imply, that 
she has stopped being a moral patient as well? And if so, 
why believe that we owe her any compliance, why feel 
duty-bound to take seriously into consideration what she 
wants for herself, at all?  
This objection, however, misses the point. The 
loss of the capacity for (rational and moral) agency does 
not entail the loss of the capacity to generate, by the power 
of one's will (as opposed to mere wish or desire or whim), 
valid moral claims on others. All my rebuttal implies is that 
due to Diane Pretty's condition we are no longer under 
moral obligation to respect her dignity (since not just her 
life, but her own self may be completely devoid of it). We 
may, however, nevertheless well be (since she is still 
undisputably a rational valuer and decision-maker) under 
an obligation to respect her (rational) will. To try to 
dissasociate the principle of respect for a person's dignity 
from the principle of respect for her will in such a way is 
neither arbitrary nor ad hoc. Kantians themselves admit 
that we can occasionally discharge our duty to respect the 
dignity of a person only by taking her life. What my account 
of Diane Pretty's situation suggests in addition to this is 
just that some of these situations will be characterized by 
another morally relevant feature - the fact that by doing so 
we will also comply with the person's own will and the 
judgment that underlies it. Hence even if we deny her the 
capacity for agency, Diane Pretty's moral status won't 
automatically reduce to that of a non-rational non-human 
animal (thereby exposing her to all kinds of morally 
unproblematic degrading and harmful treatments). 
  
6. Conclusion 
Let me recapitulate. In the paper I have argued, 
indirectly, in favor of a positive, even if qualified, moral 
judgment on active euthanasia (as well as proposals to 
legalize it). I have done so by showing that Velleman's 
argument for the claim that by euthanazing the terminally-
ill patient we would violate either the principle of respect for 
his dignity or the principle of respect for his autonomy, is 
flawed. Dignity pertains to persons in virtue of their 
capacity for a rational and autonomous choice and agency. 
Clear-minded, competent patients like Diane Pretty have 
their dignity compromised, because the disease has 
robbed them of their capacity for agency. Unless we 
acknowledge, and give proper weight to, the intimate link 
between the concept of (as well as the value in) a person 
and the concept of an agent (a link that figures so 
prominently in Kant's moral philosophy, but is plausible 
enough as such), we will keep misapplying the principle of 
respect for dignity in all the numerous ways recorded in 
ethical discussions, past and present.1 
 
                                                     
1 I owe thanks to Prof. Barabasova for an insightful discussion on the topic. 
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